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Abstract  
In this paper I examine how the New Zealand government, through the Treaty of 
Waitangi settlement process, is providing contemporary reparation for historical 
injustices against Maori tribes.  Because historical injustices involve the 
interactions of cultures over time, justice in New Zealand’s Treaty settlement 
process is shaped, and constrained, by two key factors: ‘culture’ and ‘time’.  First, 
I make the case that justice in the Treaty settlement process is only that part of 
justice that is shared by Maori and the New Zealand Crown and that this shared 
conception of justice is found in the Treaty of Waitangi (the influence of ‘culture’).  
Following on from this, I show how the Treaty as the shared standard of justice 
limits the justice in the Treaty settlement process in important ways.  Second, I 
argue that because reparation for historical injustice is made in the present, and 
works into the future, justice in the Treaty settlement process is not full 
reparative justice (the influence of ‘time’).  Rather, although the justice of the 
Treaty settlement process is by nature reparative, its scope is limited by 
contemporary, and prospective, justice concerns.  I argue, finally, that the Treaty 
settlement process reflects a reconciliatory approach to reparative justice where 
the cultural survival of Maori through restoration of the promises of the Treaty is 
given greater weight than the provision of full reparation for past wrongs. 
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Introduction 
In 1975 the Waitangi Tribunal was established to investigate Maori1  claims of 
prejudice arising from the failure of the New Zealand Crown2 to honour the Treaty 
of Waitangi from 1975 onwards. 3   When, a decade later, the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction was extended back to the signing of the Treaty in 1840, there began 
the complex task of inquiring into, hearing, and ultimately resolving, all Maori 
claims of historical injustice.4   In this paper I examine how the New Zealand 
government, through the Treaty of Waitangi settlement process, is providing 
contemporary reparation for historical injustices against Maori tribes.   
 
I argue that because these kinds of historical injustices involve the interactions 
between two distinct cultures over time, the justice available in New Zealand’s 
Treaty settlement process is shaped, and at times constrained, by two key 
factors: ‘culture’ and ‘time’.  First, I make the case that justice in the Treaty 
settlement process is only that part of justice that is shared by Maori and the New 
Zealand Crown and that this shared conception of justice is found in the Treaty of 
Waitangi (the influence of ‘culture’).  Following on from this, I show how the 
Treaty, as the shared standard of justice, limits the justice in the Treaty 
settlement process in important ways.  Second, I argue that because reparation 
for historical injustice is made in the present, and works into the future, justice in 
the Treaty settlement process is not full reparative justice (the influence of 
‘time’).  Rather, although the justice of the Treaty settlement process is by nature 
reparative, its scope is limited by contemporary, and prospective, justice 
concerns.  To date, settlements reached between Maori and the Crown have 
included not only apologies, but also substantial financial and cultural redress.  I 
argue, finally, that this reflects a reconciliatory approach to reparative justice 
where the cultural survival of Maori through the restoration of the promises of the 
Treaty is given greater weight than the provision of full reparation for past 
wrongs. 
 
In this paper, the ‘Treaty settlement process’ refers to a range of formal 
procedures whereby Maori who claim to have suffered prejudice as a result of 
Crown breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi reach agreement with the New Zealand 
government that an injustice requiring reparation did in fact occur, and negotiate 
appropriate redress to remedy the prejudice suffered.5  The Crown has accepted 
that it has a moral obligation to resolve historical injustices for breaches of the 
Treaty of Waitangi, and ‘principles’ derived from it. 6   Any individual Maori or 
group of Maori who claims to be prejudicially affected by breaches of the Treaty 
may lodge a claim with the Waitangi Tribunal.  In most cases, the Tribunal then 
hears the claim and produces findings and recommendations.  Armed with these, 
the Maori claimant group negotiates with the Crown, typically leading to a Deed 
of Settlement implemented by legislation.7  Settlement redress usually includes 
an apology (both written in legislation and spoken), financial compensation, the 
return of significant sites and sometimes resources, measures to restore cultural 
identity and authority, and measures intended to lay the foundations for ongoing 
just relations between the state and Maori claimant groups.8
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The influence of ‘culture’ 
It is clear that both Maori and the New Zealand Crown expect the Treaty 
settlement process to achieve ‘justice’.9  But in any cross-cultural discourse about 
‘justice’, how can we be sure that the parties are talking about the same thing 
and are not just talking past each other?  ‘Justice’ is not an object independent of 
the meanings given to it in different contexts, or against which any translation of 
the word can be verified in cross-cultural exchanges.10  When two cultures meet, 
interact, and speak about justice, each brings its historical and cultural 
perspective to those interactions, perhaps highlighting certain facets or 
applications of justice in the process.  Those conceptions of justice might be very 
different.  In the New Zealand context, academic Andrew Sharp’s comprehensive 
study of Maori claims to justice shows that the main cultural groups in New 
Zealand, Maori and Pakeha (Non-Maori New Zealanders, primarily of European 
descent) 11 , “as a matter of fact ... have separate and often contradictory 
conceptions of what justice demands”. 12   Is there any overlap or agreement 
between these different cultural perspectives of justice in contemporary New 
Zealand? 
A shared standard of justice 
Sharp suggests that there is an agreed or shared justice in New Zealand, sourced 
in the Treaty of Waitangi.13
 
It is an ancient idea to think that in the absence of widespread agreement 
on the depth and detail of justice a thinner conception of justice can be 
constructed by two or more parties.  This justice can now be enforced as 
justice must be if it is to be justice and not just an ideal of good conduct.  
It can be enforced because now justice consists in giving people their 
rights specified in contract rather than their rights according to the 
disputed conceptions of what justice is.14
 
Sharp demonstrates that (at least from 1987) Maori made the Treaty of Waitangi 
a sacred, solemn contract, and the standard of justice between Maori and the 
Crown. 15   Although Pakeha have undoubtedly lagged behind in accepting the 
Treaty as the standard of justice, at least by the mid-1980s for the first time 
there was growing support in government circles for the notion of the Treaty as 
the standard of justice, breaches of which required reparation. 16   The 
establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975, the extension of its jurisdiction to 
cover historical claims in 1985,17 and the various ways in which the principles of 
the Treaty were enshrined in legislation in the 1980s and 1990s,18 demonstrate 
the growing acceptance of the Treaty as a standard of just conduct between Maori 
and the Crown.  The jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal, in particular, clearly 
shows that the Treaty is to be the standard of justice between the Crown and 
Maori.19  In practice, therefore, the ‘justice’ of the Treaty settlement process is 
found in the shared institution of the Treaty of Waitangi.20  So what is the Treaty 
of Waitangi and what does it promise? 
Centre for Indigenous Governance and Development 
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The Treaty of Waitangi 
The Treaty of Waitangi was signed by representatives of Her Majesty Queen 
Victoria and Maori rangatira (chiefs) on 6 February 1840, and subsequently.21   
Despite its apparent simplicity—the Treaty consists of a preamble and three short 
articles—the precise meaning and application of the Treaty has been the subject 
of sustained debate, not least because it was signed in both English and Maori 
languages (with many rangatira only signing a Maori version) where the English 
version is not a direct, or accurate, translation of the Maori version.  Significantly, 
in the English version, Maori ceded full ‘sovereignty’ to the Crown, but in the 
Maori version only ‘kawanatanga’, most often translated as ‘governance’, was 
ceded.22  From the perspectives of the rangatira, ‘kawanatanga’ would not have 
had connotations of sovereignty and thus it seems that Maori chiefs would not 
have understood the Treaty to cede their tribal authority.23   
 
Moreover, in exchange for ceding ‘kawanatanga’ to the British, Article II of the 
Treaty reserved to Maori “tino rangatiratanga”, their chieftainship, over their 
lands, homes and other “taonga”, or “valuable possessions and attributes, 
concrete or abstract”.24  In the English version, this was worded as reserving to 
Maori their “full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates 
Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually 
possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their 
possession”.  From a Maori perspective, the reservation of ‘rangatiratanga’ in 
Article II would have signalled a guarantee of tribal sovereignty.25  This crucial 
tension between the grant of ‘sovereignty’ to the Crown in Article I of the English 
version and the retention of ‘tino rangatiratanga’ in Article II in the Maori version 
of the Treaty is central to contemporary debates about Maori Treaty rights.  
 
Despite the ambiguities and tensions inherent in, and arising from, the Treaty 
texts, the British Crown proclaimed its full sovereignty over the islands of New 
Zealand.26  In doing so, and in the subsequent colonisation that took place with 
little or no recognition of Maori rights, the British Crown, and later the Crown in 
right of New Zealand, took more sovereignty than was ceded under the Treaty.27  
The Treaty was regarded legally as “a simple nullity”28 for much of New Zealand’s 
history leading to Maori dispossession, poverty and ongoing disadvantage. 29   
After decades of sustained and increasing Maori objections to the Crown for its 
failure to recognise the Treaty, Maori protests escalated, culminating in thousands 
of Maori marching on Parliament in 1975.30  In response to these pressures,31 the 
Waitangi Tribunal was established to investigate Crown behaviour, and to make 
non-binding recommendations to resolve well-founded Maori claims.32  Over the 
next fifteen years, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was increase, 33  further 
indicating the Crown’s growing acceptance of the Treaty as a source of binding 
obligations.34   
The Treaty as shared justice 
The Treaty as shared justice in the Treaty settlement process has allowed “ideas 
of justice in contract and reparation for breach of contract” to guide the Maori-
Crown dialogue of justice in the Treaty settlement process. 35   Despite the 
difficulties of regarding the Treaty as a contract containing strict rights, the 
Treaty as shared justice at least enables the Crown and Maori to agree that a 
breach of the Treaty is an injustice requiring reparation.  Clearly, if the standard 
of justice in the Treaty settlement process is located in the Treaty, then justice 
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exists in fulfilling the promises of the Treaty.  Article II of the Treaty guarantees 
to Maori rangatiratanga over their lands and other taonga, which has been 
interpreted by the Waitangi Tribunal as including a guarantee of tribal mana 
(authority, control, prestige, power), rangatiratanga (chieftainship), and 
turangawaewae (literally, a place to stand), albeit adapted in light of the changed 
circumstances of the contemporary context. 36   In other words, the Treaty 
guaranteed to Maori their cultural survival.  Here we see a combination of the 
influence of both ‘culture’ and ‘time’ on the content of justice in the Treaty 
settlement process. 
 
However, as already noted, the Treaty itself does not easily lend itself to 
agreement about its exact meaning.  The Treaty has many interpretations: “It 
has multivalent locutionary force because it is in two languages, in at least five 
versions in English; and though it is in only one version in te reo Maori, Maori is a 
language which plays on multivalence”.37   It has proved fecund of conflicting 
interpretations.  Perhaps in response to the problems of interpreting the Treaty as 
a contract containing strict rights,38 the New Zealand Parliament, the Waitangi 
Tribunal, and the New Zealand courts, have also viewed the Treaty as a living 
document that speaks in contemporary contexts, 39  and have emphasised the 
principles of the Treaty, rather than its strict text.40  The principles are derived 
from the articles of the Treaty itself 41  and include: the Treaty implies a 
partnership between Maori and the Crown characterised by a duty to act in good 
faith and co-operation; the right of the Crown to govern is subject to a duty of 
active protection of Maori interests, and in particular, tino rangatiratanga over 
resources and taonga (treasured possessions), but is not unreasonably restricted; 
and the Crown has a duty to remedy past breaches of the Treaty. 42   The 
principles of the Treaty help to define just conduct between the Treaty partners 
over time, but they too are vague and open to differing interpretations.  This 
ambiguity in the Treaty and its principles, and its practical application, means that 
all the specifics of reparative justice applied in a particular Treaty settlement 
must be negotiated.  The point, however, should be clear: the Treaty frames the 
justice of the Treaty settlement process and the dialogue which takes place within 
this process. 
Constraints flowing from the Treaty as shared justice 
There are three important implications of the Treaty of Waitangi being the source 
of shared justice in the Treaty settlement process.  First, the boundaries of the 
sovereignty arrangements established by the Treaty itself apply. 43   Debate is 
therefore focused on the relationship between the sovereignty (kawanatanga) 
ceded to the Crown under Article I of the Treaty, and the rangatiratanga 
(authority, chieftainship) retained by Maori according to Article II without 
questioning the ultimate right of the Crown to govern.  For some, this is a severe 
limitation on the justice which Treaty settlements are able to achieve. 
 
The second major constraint flows from the first.  Because the ultimate 
sovereignty of the Crown is not under question, the Crown has general good 
governance duties with respect to the wider New Zealand community.  It also 
remains responsible for dispensing justice, albeit through different arms of the 
state in accordance with the principles of Westminster government.  But the 
Crown is also the wrongdoer in this scenario of historical injustice, and the 
contemporary entity responsible for making reparation.44  Australian academic 
Susan Dodds has suggested that in such situations “there is a genuine question 
about the authority of the state to encapsulate indigenous people’s concerns 
within the state”.45  A similar line is taken by academic James Tully who, focusing 
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on the North American context, argues, “many of the representative Western 
theories of property do not provide an impartial conceptual framework in which 
[Indigenous peoples’] demands for justice with respect to property can be 
adjudicated”.46  He suggests that a “cross-cultural ‘middle ground’ composed of 
early modern Aboriginal and common-law systems of property, and their 
authoritative traditions of interpretation”, is required in such situations. 47   
Leaving aside the inherent difficulties of achieving an impartial conceptual 
framework in any case, in New Zealand some of the issues identified by Dodds 
and Tully are ameliorated by the unique status and operation of the Waitangi 
Tribunal.  
 
The Waitangi Tribunal embodies bicultural elements and has played a key role in 
developing a New Zealand-based bicultural jurisprudence.48   The Tribunal has 
provided a forum for the greater understanding of the issues at stake for Maori 
through the re-telling of history from the claimant group’s perspective, and has 
provided an analysis of the effects of past wrongs from within the institutions and 
value systems of particular claimant groups. 49   To some extent, then, these 
factors suggest that the Treaty settlement process is a ‘cross-cultural middle 
ground’ and they go some way to countering the fact that settlements are, in 
general, made within a system based on common law principles.   
 
However, the Tribunal’s limited ability to bind the Crown diminishes these positive 
aspects of the Tribunal’s work and suggests that the Crown holds most, if not all, 
of the cards, and can decide whether or not to play by the rules of the game in 
the Treaty settlement process.  For example, the Crown is not bound by the 
Tribunal’s findings of fact and therefore, is not bound by the Tribunal’s 
determination that a breach of Treaty principles has (or has not) taken place50 or 
the resulting inference that an injustice requiring reparation has in fact 
occurred.51  Moreover, the Tribunal has limited powers to bind Crown action, and 
has generally only made non-binding recommendations regarding appropriate 
reparation, leaving the Crown and Maori claimant groups to negotiate just 
redress.52  Ultimately, the Crown has the power to dissolve the Tribunal or to 
restrict its powers.   
 
The merging of Crown roles thus limits the kind of justice that the Treaty 
settlement process is able to achieve, and the justice of the Treaty settlement 
process is, in these respects, a negotiated justice. 53   Because the Treaty of 
Watiangi is full of ambiguity, the specifics of Treaty promises, in any given 
context, must also be negotiated.  This leads to the third implication of the Treaty 
as shared justice, this time presented by way of a dilemma.  If justice means 
giving each party what is theirs by right, and there is no agreement about the 
content of those rights (as is the case here where there is no agreement on the 
content and application of the rights promised by the Treaty of Waitangi), can the 
results of the Treaty settlement process be called ‘justice’ at all?  Or are they 
better described as the best deal that can be struck between (often unequal) 
bargainers? 
 
Centre for Indigenous Governance and Development 
- 5 - 
CIGAD Working Paper No. 2/2005 
 
The influence of ‘time’ 
In situations of historical injustice, the aim is to put right past wrongs.  This is the 
work of reparative justice.  It can be distinguished from distributive justice,54 
which concerns the justice of distributions of resources (and duties) in society55 
and retributive justice, which is concerned with the punishment of wrongdoers.56  
Sharp suggests:  
 
Reparative justice is a reciprocal exchange between two equal parties, 
recognizing the same standards of right, whereby one party having done 
wrong to the other, repairs that wrong by restoring the wronged party to 
his, her, their or its ... position before the wrong.  I wrongly take your 
land; I return it.  I arrogate your authority; I restore it to you.  I do not 
benefit from the transaction: your suffering is relieved; balance is restored 
and justice in transactions is done.57
 
Put simply, reparative justice “consists in having an equal amount before and 
after the transaction”.58  This notion of justice accords with the Maori principle of 
‘utu’ meaning “‘repayment’ or ‘compensation’ or ‘reciprocity’, restoring some sort 
of balance, exacting what is due, or what is demanded by the situation”. 59   
Significantly, because “utu is essentially a mechanism for restoring lost mana 
[tribal authority, power]”,60 it is a core aspect of justice in the Treaty settlement 
process.  Many Maori argue for reparation in this vein:  “As land was taken, so 
land should be returned”.61  However, it is not always so simple.  The fact that 
reparation is made in contemporary contexts gives rise to difficulties that throw 
doubt on the ability to achieve justice.  These dilemmas will now be explored in 
the context of the Treaty settlement process to determine whether there can be 
any justice at all in Treaty settlements. 
Who's who in historical injustices? 
One dilemma raised by situations of historical injustice is who ought to pay 
compensation or make restoration, and to whom? 62   Because decades or 
centuries may have lapsed between the time of the injustice and the present in 
which reparation is being made, in most cases the individuals involved in the 
historical situation of injustice are no longer alive.  What rights do present-day 
descendants of the victims have to claim recompense for what was done to their 
ancestors, and what duties do the current generation owe to make good those 
wrongs?63
 
Some philosophers have suggested that an individual cannot be harmed by 
(unjust) events occurring before that individual was conceived,64 and moreover 
that present-day individuals may owe their very existence to such events.65  They 
conclude therefore, that present-day individuals cannot claim recompense for 
events occurring before their lifetimes.66  This reasoning suggests that, in the 
Treaty settlement process, individual Maori have no moral claim to reparation for 
breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi suffered by their ancestors.  The Treaty 
settlement process recognises, however, that past injustices may have ongoing 
effects, and that injustices may persist over time: any Maori who claims to be 
prejudicially affected by breaches of the Treaty, including breaches going back to 
the signing of the Treaty, can make a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal.67   
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The ongoing effects of persisting historical injustice do seem to affect 
communities over time. 68   Present-day communities may well suffer the 
consequence of past wrongs (for example, in the case of Maori exhibiting low 
socio-economic status) and therefore, it can be argued that there is a moral right 
to redress persisting injustice over time, despite the death of the individuals 
directly involved in the past wrong.  Alternatively, one can reason that because 
only communities can be harmed by injustices occurring before the time of their 
individual members’ respective conceptions, “the only entities capable of 
deserving reparations for ancient wrongs are ‘communities’”.69  Accordingly, what 
is important is that the “community”, 70  or a “related group of persons”, 71  
continues to exist.72  This latter argument is particularly persuasive in the context 
of the Treaty settlement process because the Treaty of Waitangi, as the shared 
standard of justice, determines the parties to injustice as the parties to the 
Treaty. 
 
The parties to the Treaty of Waitangi were Queen Victoria and Maori chiefs.  
Whilst not envisaged by the Treaty, in 1863, the conventions of responsible 
government in Maori matters were transferred from the United Kingdom to New 
Zealand,73 and “the obligations of Her Majesty, the Queen of England, under the 
Treaty are now those of the Crown in right of New Zealand”.74  Therefore, the 
enduring notion of ‘the Crown’ can clearly be established and the present entity 
responsible for providing redress for breaches of the Treaty is the Crown in right 
of New Zealand, in practice the government of the day. 
 
There seems little doubt that Maori collectives have endured “in spite of the 
mortality of individual members”75 since the Treaty was signed.  Whilst any Maori 
may bring a claim for breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi,76 in practice individuals 
have tended to bring claims on behalf of wider descent groups.  Maori society, 
however, has always been dynamic, and the form and importance of different 
groupings within Maori society has changed over time.77  Further, current Maori 
collectives may be constituted by a variety of legal means including trust 
boards,78  incorporated societies,79  Maori incorporations,80  and other corporate 
structures.81  Careful historical analysis will be needed to ascertain whether an 
entity making a contemporary claim has historical continuity with the unjustly 
treated Maori collective in question. 82   There may be questions of degree in 
particular cases.  Certainly this line of argument raises major uncertainties for 
more recent collectives of Maori, such as the urban collective known as the 
Waiperaira Trust, wishing to pursue claims for historical injustices done to Maori 
generally.  For some, this may be a major limitation on the justice the Treaty 
settlement process can deliver.  There is also an unresolved issue where the 
Crown’s breaches were so detrimental that Maori communities fragmented or 
even dissolved altogether.83  In the latter situation, the Treaty settlement process 
offers no justice at all.84   
 
Despite these shortcomings, at this stage it is sufficient to accept that there are 
many enduring Maori collectives with historical continuity and so there is a 
prospect of achieving some kind of justice in the Treaty settlement process.  In 
practice, the New Zealand Crown has provided redress primarily to (historical) 
Maori collectives such as iwi (tribes), sometimes to major hapu (sub-tribes),85 
and less often to whanau (families),86 resulting in a constraint on the kind of 
justice available in the Treaty settlement process.  Reparation is not made to 
individuals, nor to contemporary Maori collectives without direct historical 
continuity and reparation will only benefit individuals through membership of 
historically linked, contemporary Maori collectives. 
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The counterfactual and restoration approaches to reparative justice 
Applying reparative justice in contemporary contexts leads to other difficulties,87 
and resulting constraints on justice.  Assuming that the appropriate parties can 
be established, the first step of reparative justice is to determine that a wrong 
has been done.  In the Treaty settlement process, the Treaty of Waitangi provides 
this necessary standard of justice.  The next step, ideally, is to return the victims 
to their position before the breach.  But how can this be done?  The clock cannot 
be turned back, nor can be erased the fact that generations have lived their lives 
in conditions of ongoing injustice. 88   Situations of historical injustice involve 
complex interactions between communities over time where, in addition to 
numerous isolated incidents of past injustice, there are continuing institutional 
injustices.89   
 
The world we know is characterized by patterns of injustice, by standing 
arrangements—rules, laws, regimes, and other institutions—that operate 
unjustly day after day.  Though the establishment of such arrangements 
was an unjust event when it took place in the past, its injustice then 
consisted primarily in the injustice it promised for the future.90
 
Reparative justice must ameliorate the effects of each past injustice and of 
ongoing injustice, as well as prevent the repetition of injustice caused by 
continuing unjust arrangements.91   
 
One approach, the ‘counterfactual approach’, concentrates on ameliorating the 
effects of past injustice.92  This approach begins by imagining what the world 
would be like today if the particular injustice had not occurred.  The second step 
is to provide redress to ensure that the actual situation matches, as far as is 
possible, the imagined, or counterfactual, situation of no injustice.  The victims of 
injustice will thereby be put in the position they would have been, but for the 
injustice.93  In terms of utu, the balance is thereby restored.   
 
Another approach, the ‘restoration approach’, focuses on remitting ongoing 
injustice.  This second approach seeks to restore that which was taken unjustly 
(for example, property or mana (tribal authority)), thereby preventing the 
continuation of that injustice. 94   Again, there are similarities with the Maori 
concept of utu as a process of restoring lost mana. 
 
The counterfactual and restorative approaches are not mutually exclusive and 
both offer guidance in navigating the complex territory of historical injustice.95  
There are situations where reparation might entail both models: in the New 
Zealand context it may be appropriate to restore unjustly expropriated land and 
pay compensation to fully reflect the situation the victims would have enjoyed 
had the expropriation not occurred (for example, to reflect an income stream the 
land may have generated during the period of expropriation).  Further, a 
counterfactual approach may involve restoration of something denied unjustly 
where that thing would have been retained but for the injustice.  Similar to the 
counterfactual approach, the restoration approach may require changes to unjust 
institutional arrangements that perpetuate breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi, to 
ensure that contemporary and future arrangements reflect the promises of the 
Treaty.  Accordingly, the difference in application between the two approaches is 
at times subtle.   
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The constraint of moral authority and the counterfactual approach  
But how can we ascertain what today’s world would look like had the relevant 
injustice not occurred so that reparation might be made to reflect that just, 
counterfactual, situation?  For example, what would today’s world look like if the 
New Zealand Crown had honoured the Treaty of Waitangi?  If it is assumed that 
Maori lands were not unjustly expropriated in the past, what would have 
happened in the intervening years?  To what extent can it be said that persons or 
collectives would have made one choice over others in any given counterfactual 
situation? 
 
Some events are random or the product of free choice, and therefore do not 
simply follow from antecedent conditions. Further, according to philosopher 
Jeremy Waldron, these types of non-deterministic events are exactly the focus of 
inquiry: 
 
The expropriation of Maori lands, for example, did not take place according 
to inexorable laws of nature.  It took place because certain wilful and 
greedy individuals decided to seize those lands in circumstances in which 
they could easily have done otherwise. ... [I]t was a contingency, not a 
necessity ... .96
 
The fundamental problem lies in the limitations of rational choice theory.  
Waldron argues: “The thing about freedom [of choice] is that there is no fact of 
the matter anywhere until the choice has been made.  It is the choice that has 
authority, not the existence as such of the chosen option.”97  Accordingly, how 
can we be sure of the moral authority of a specific counterfactual constructed for 
reparation in the Treaty settlement process?98  And if no moral authority can be 
found, is there any justice at all? 
 
The Waitangi Tribunal has reasoned that the Treaty of Waitangi “did not see the 
loss of tribal identity as a necessary consequence of European settlement”. 99   
Rather, the Treaty guaranteed Maori rangatiratanga (the exercise of chieftainship) 
and therefore, Maori authority, identity and culture.  If this is accepted, the 
Treaty as the shared notion of justice gives moral authority to the proposition 
that if injustices (Treaty breaches) had not occurred, Maori would now have 
sufficient land and resources, a turangawaewae, from which to exercise their 
tribal authority: this is the very assurance of the Treaty.  On this approach, it is 
not necessary to know precisely what land and resources would have been 
retained but for the injustice, and the problems of rational choice theory are 
thereby minimised, if not completely resolved.100   
 
Using this approach, justice in the Treaty settlement process requires that the 
present situation is modified to reflect the counterfactual world in which Maori 
culture survives and flourishes, and Maori have rangatiratanga over natural 
resources as envisaged by the Treaty.  This would involve providing not only 
apologies for past wrongs, but also financial compensation, the return of tribal 
lands and resources, measures to restore cultural identity and authority, and 
measures intended to lay foundations for ongoing just relations between the state 
and Maori claimant groups.  By providing this kind of redress the promises of the 
Treaty are restored and ongoing injustices remitted, thus indicating an overlap 
with the restoration approach to reparative justice.  
 
But the amount of compensation, which tribal lands and resources, and what 
measures to restore tribal authority, are all open to debate and must be 
negotiated in any particular settlement.  Consequently this approach presents, 
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once again, the problem left to answer in the previous section: if we accept that 
justice consists in giving people their rights and that there is no agreement as to 
the content of Maori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi, are the results of the 
Treaty settlement process ‘justice’ at all, or merely the best deal available in the 
circumstances?  I have argued elsewhere that the intention of the parties in the 
Treaty settlement process is, without doubt, to achieve justice for past wrongs.101  
And intentions are important.  It matters who makes reparation in situations of 
historical injustice, and why, because the acknowledgement of a wrong for which 
the wrongdoer is responsible to make good is one of the characteristics of 
reparative justice that distinguishes it from distributive justice.102  In other words, 
reparative justice depends on the relationship between the wrongdoer and the 
victim.  Here, the New Zealand Crown has accepted moral culpability for historical 
injustices against Maori tribes, and the negotiations that lead to settlements are 
made in that context.  For example, in the Ngai Tahu settlement the Crown made 
the following apology in both written and spoken form: 
 
The Crown expresses its profound regret and apologises unreservedly to 
all members of Ngai Tahu Whanui for the suffering and hardship caused to 
Ngai Tahu, and for the harmful effects which resulted to the welfare, 
economy and development of Ngai Tahu as a tribe.  The Crown 
acknowledges that such suffering, hardship and harmful effects resulted 
from its failures to honour its obligations to Ngai Tahu under the deeds of 
purchase whereby it acquired Ngai Tahu lands, to set aside adequate lands 
for the tribe's use, to allow reasonable access to traditional sources of 
food, to protect Ngai Tahu's rights to pounamu and such other valued 
possessions as the tribe wished to retain, or to remedy effectually Ngai 
Tahu's grievances.  ... [T]he Crown seeks on behalf of all New Zealanders 
to atone for these acknowledged injustices, so far as that is now possible, 
and, with the historical grievances finally settled ... to begin a process of 
healing and to enter a new age of co-operation with Ngai Tahu.103
 
An agreement reached in such a context of sincere apology and intention to 
achieve justice is not simply a political deal.  In such a context, it is justice of 
some kind.  So if giving victims of historical injustices what is theirs by right is 
impossible,104 or presents us with seemingly insurmountable dilemmas, is there 
another suitable conception of justice in reparations?   
Reparation as reconciliation  
Rather than a rights-based approach, Australian academic Janna Thompson 
argues that in situations of historical injustice (and in particular, instances of 
colonial domination of Indigenous peoples) “a reconciliatory theory provides a 
defensible and attractive approach to reparation”.105  She argues:  
 
Those who enter such [reconciliatory] negotiations are likely to have 
different views about what is just.  Reconciliation is a process of mutual 
accommodation … Reconciliation is a process involving discourse, in which 
attempts to reach what Rawls calls ‘overlapping consensus’: a result that 
each can endorse from his or her point of view.106
 
According to Thompson, reconciliation is actually achieved: 
 
… when the harm done by the injustice to relations of respect and trust 
that ought to exist between individuals or nations has been repaired or 
compensated for by the perpetrator in such a way that his harm is no 
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longer regarded as standing in the way of establishing or re-establishing 
these relations.107
 
Here the aim is not to provide full reparation according to rights, but rather to 
achieve a mutually acceptable accommodation of claims that allows the parties to 
move forward in a relationship of good faith and trust.  In situations where the 
rights and culture of Indigenous peoples have been denied unjustly in the past, 
this will likely involve the giving of an apology, at least, and also the provision of 
substantive redress to restore the victim to a position of strength so that the 
ongoing relationship between the parties is one of equality or partnership. The 
Treaty of Waitangi provides the boundaries for negotiating such an “overlapping 
consensus” in New Zealand’s Treaty settlement process.  Further, the 
counterfactual of ensuring Maori cultural survival sounds very much like 
Thompson’s reconciliatory approach: by providing reparation (including an 
apology) to restore the cultural integrity of the tribe, the parties are able to re-
establish a relationship of respect and trust.  Thus, reparative justice as 
reconciliation allows us to view the results of the Treaty settlement process as 
‘justice’ while accepting that it may be impossible, strictly speaking, to give Maori 
claimant groups their full rights under the Treaty either because there is limited 
agreement about what those rights are or it is simply outside the power of the 
wrongdoer to provide them. 
 
But a reconciliatory approach is still subject to problems arising from providing 
reparation in contemporary contexts.  A theory of reparation as reconciliation 
must provide, for example, guidance on what the victim can rightly demand by 
way of redress.108  To what extent is the present position of the wrongdoer, or 
the contemporary context generally, relevant to what makes a just demand for 
redress?  Similarly if we use the counterfactual approach we must address the 
relevance of contemporary justice concerns.  For example, there is no single 
correct counterfactual that describes a New Zealand where breaches of the Treaty 
did not take place and Maori culture survived and flourished, but rather many 
possible ones.  In deciding which particular scenario to mimic in reparation, the 
justice of current or future distributions may guide our choice of counterfactual to 
replicate in reparation.109   
 
But in any case, why be content with a world where the relevant injustice did not 
occur, when an even better, more just, world could be envisaged?110  Waldron 
reasons that, “if any part of our concern about justice has to do with the relative 
size or distribution of people’s holdings independent of their history—then the 
counterfactual approach to reparation may not be the last word”.111  This is a live 
issue in New Zealand debate, where reparative justice is not seen as “the sum 
total of justice and good policy”.112  For example, the (former) Chief Judge of the 
Waitangi Tribunal has mused, “Need the resettlement of the landless tribes 
depend upon proof of some past wrong or is it more equitable to apportion 
assistance having regard to need?  Does the reparation approach in any event 
create more problems than it solves?”113  More obviously, if providing particular 
redress takes us to another situation of injustice, creates a new injustice, or 
otherwise does not improve our contemporary situation, then what?   
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Contemporary justice concerns 
Reparation is made in the present.  Just as other contextual factors influence the 
application of justice, so too will the present situation.  Whilst reparative justice in 
situations of historical injustice focuses on the past to identify an injustice and its 
effects over time, it is not possible to change that past.  Reparative justice can, 
therefore, only work in the present, and into the future, to change the effects of 
past injustice and to remit continuing injustices.114  What is required now to right 
past wrongs depends both on the past and the present, and to an extent, on our 
imagining of the benefits which contemporary reparation will bring in the future.  
How do these temporal factors shape reparative justice in the Treaty settlement 
process? 
 
First, the contemporary context limits the application of reparative justice in the 
Treaty settlement process because any substantive reparation is made with 
current resources.  A thing cannot be restored if it no longer exists.115  Further, 
there seems little point in returning something damaged or so changed that it no 
longer has value, or if a cultural context has changed in the intervening years to 
an extent where things once important no longer hold particular relevance.  
Accordingly, the current context influences the kind of solution that is just; the 
redress provided today must be relevant to today’s circumstances.   
 
Second, because providing reparation for past wrongs is an allocation (or 
redistribution116) of current resources, that allocation must be justified, morally, 
and hence politically, in relation to other competing claims on those resources.  
Where full reparative justice cannot be justified in the face of other 
contemporary, competing claims, reparative justice in the Treaty settlement 
process is likely to be constrained.  Waldron argues that claims for full reparation 
may not always be justified because changes in background circumstances over 
decades and generations may alter the validity of specific moral claims to land or 
resources.117  Any moral duty to restore land and resources unjustly expropriated 
in the past will be restricted to situations where the claim to those lands and 
resources survives into the present.  Why would changes in background 
circumstances change such claims?   
 
Waldron suggests that initial entitlements to property may fade with time 118  
because the longer the property is out of an individual’s possession and control, 
the less it plays an indispensable role in that person’s life.119   New Zealand’s 
Treaty settlement process, and particularly the evidence given by Maori to the 
Waitangi Tribunal, has clearly shown just how important land and natural 
resources are to tribal identity and cultural survival.120  Moral claims to particular 
sites and resources integral to aboriginal identity and cultural survival are as valid 
today as in the past.121  But it must be recognised that there are “many ways of 
being harmed that do not involve violations of property rights at all”. 122   For 
example: 
 
People who lose their lands to an alien culture bear the additional risk of 
identity loss and social and cultural impairment.  This could not have been 
more apparent than in the confiscation of Maori land, where the effect was 
not only to acquire land but to take control of the people and to effect a 
social reordering.  Loss therefore must be assessed not only in terms of 
individual deprivation and personal suffering but in terms of the 
impairment of the group's social and economic capacity, the general 
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distortion of its physical and spiritual well-being, and the flow-on effects of 
subsequent standards of living.123
 
A moral claim to own and control sufficient land and resources to ensure cultural 
survival, and to restore cultural identity, persists over time and does not diminish 
because a tribal land base was historically unjustly removed from Maori 
possession and control.  In terms of reparation as reconciliation, it is just for the 
victim to demand sufficient land, resources and other measures to restore the 
economic and cultural base of the tribe and to demand changes to institutional 
arrangements to ensure a just relationship over time.  The Waitangi Tribunal has 
echoed this line of thought arguing, “where the place of a hapu [tribe] has been 
wrongly diminished, an appropriate response is to ask what is necessary to re-
establish it”.124  Here both cultural and temporal factors shape the justice of the 
Treaty settlement process.   
 
However, the argument clearly suggests that a moral entitlement to all lands and 
resources once in the possession or control of Indigenous groups may not survive 
changed circumstances.  The immense changes in the world’s population in the 
past two hundred years mean that Indigenous populations can no longer be 
afforded exclusive control of their former, vast territories, because to do so would 
be to relegate many others to poverty, and even starvation.  Therefore, Waldron 
argues, in such changed circumstances, an historical injustice “can be 
superseded, and its reparation trumped as it were, by principles of justice applied 
directly to present circumstances”.125  But is this to say that rights to reparation 
are totally superseded or trumped in such circumstances?  Janna Thompson, 
amongst others, thinks not: 
 
Changes in circumstances are not by themselves reasons for denying the 
obligation to make restitution for historical injustices.  At best they are 
reasons for re-negotiating agreements, or compensating for what cannot 
justly be returned, or for denying that those wronged are entitled to 
demand back all of what they once possessed.126
 
Further, according to Thompson’s reparation as reconciliation model, the victim 
has a moral responsibility “to take into account present conditions and needs” and 
not to “impose conditions that would threaten the existence or security or 
undermine the economic well-being of the other”.127  The Waitangi Tribunal has 
argued along similar lines: 
 
… the broad object of the Treaty was to secure a place for two peoples in 
one country, where both would benefit from settlement, and which 
basically required a fair sharing of resources.128
 
Applying this reasoning to New Zealand suggests that not all land once in Maori 
hands should be returned.  Full compensation for all land unjustly expropriated 
may not be justified either, if to do so would bankrupt the Treasury.129  Justice in 
the Treaty settlement process will thereby be constrained, but it is not defeated 
outright.  In practice, New Zealand settlements do take into account present 
circumstances, for example by focusing on apology, the restoration of a tribal 
economic base and the return of significant sites rather than full reparation of all 
land once in Maori control or the equivalent monetary compensation.130  Further, 
an important aim of New Zealand settlements is to lay foundations for future just 
relations between the parties.   
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It is important to note, however, that Waldron suggests that contemporary justice 
concerns should only trump reparative justice claims when full compensation or 
restitution of historical injustices would “carr[y] us in a direction contrary to that 
which is indicated by a prospective theory of justice”. 131   In the types of 
situations of historical injustices under examination here, claims for redress of 
historical wrongs and claims for fairer distribution of goods will often coincide: 
 
[P]ast injustice is not without its present effects.  It is a fact that many of 
the descendants of those who were defrauded and expropriated live 
demoralized in conditions of relative poverty—relative, that is, to the 
conditions borne by the descendants of those who defrauded them.  If the 
relief of poverty and the more equal distribution of resources are the aims 
of a prospective theory of justice, it is likely that the effect of rectifying 
past wrongs will carry us some distance in this direction.132
 
Far from taking New Zealand society in a direction contrary to contemporary 
justice, reparation for Crown breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi, and the 
rebuilding of the Crown-Maori Treaty relationship, are exactly the imperatives of 
justice in the contemporary situation. 133   But the influence of contemporary 
concerns on the application of reparative justice in the Treaty settlement process 
is restricted.  The Waitangi Tribunal has cautioned that “care should be taken to 
ensure that the level of redress does not become dependent on the contemporary 
needs of iwi [tribes] that are unconnected with the historical wrongs being 
addressed”.134  At the same time, the Tribunal has placed a growing emphasis on 
the restoration of Maori tribes.135  For example, Tribunal member Orr argues that 
“[t]he assurance of a more secure future for legitimate tribal objectives may have 
greater weight” than a “pay off for the past”,136  and that “[f]ull restoration of the 
people as a people, may deserve more emphasis than strict legal reparation, even 
assuming such reparation is possible”.137  The Tribunal has, on many occasions, 
pointed out that the Treaty settlement process is not concerned to provide full 
redress along legal lines, but rather “to compensate for past wrongs and remove 
the prejudice, by assuring a better arrangement for the future”.138   
 
Again, the kind of justice being practiced in New Zealand resonates with 
reparation framed as reconciliation.  When considering what justice requires in 
relation to the loss of tribal mana and rangatiratanga, loss of culture, and the 
more personal psychological effects of continued dispossession and cultural 
hegemony, the relevance of retrospective justice fades, giving way to current and 
prospective concerns.  Why?  Because any hope of restoring conditions to those 
required by reparative justice are necessarily focussed on how our current 
arrangements might be changed to allow for the future cultural survival of Maori 
and for a just relationship between the state and Maori over time.  How the 
Treaty can be given effect to, and how the mana of Maori claimant groups can 
best be restored, changes with changing circumstances, and requires 
consideration of the contemporary justice of any given situation.  The concept of 
utu also encompasses this point, suggesting that Maori concepts of reparative 
justice also include consideration of contemporary justice concerns, as is shown in 
the story of Te-rangi-tamau and Moki in which: 
 
Te-rangi-tamau creeps at night into the sleeping hut of his enemy Moki, 
but does not kill him [in an act of utu], leaving his cloak behind instead as 
evidence of his visit ... Te-rangi-tamau's wife, who has been captured by 
Moki, is present in the hut.  Quietly her husband takes her outside, 
questions her and discovers that she and his children have been well 
treated.  That is one reason why he spares Moki.  Te-rangi-tamau decides 
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that the offence for which he sought Moki's life has been wiped out by the 
good treatment of the wife and children.  Utu is no longer seen to be 
needed.  And the other crucial point is that, while they are indeed engaged 
in a quarrel, and a serious one at that, Te-rangi-tamau and Moki are kin.  
This makes a great difference.  There is a strong motive for ending the 
affair peacefully, and indeed this is just what happens.139
 
Thus, utu, as a mechanism for restoring lost mana, is sensitive to the 
contemporary contexts in which mana must be restored and, in particular, the 
need for peaceful ongoing relations between the victim and the wrongdoer.  
Accordingly, we might think of justice in New Zealand’s Treaty settlement process 
being done with one eye on the past, and the other on the present looking 
forward to a better future—a future where the ongoing relationship between the 
Treaty partners is respectful and just.140  
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, the aim for both Maori and the Crown of the Treaty settlement 
process is to achieve ‘justice’.  The kind of justice available in the Treaty 
settlement process is shaped by two principal factors: ‘culture’ and ‘time’.  Justice 
in the Treaty settlement process is only that part of justice that is shared by 
Maori and the Crown: this is found in the Treaty of Waitangi.  The Treaty, as the 
shared standard of justice, limits the justice in the Treaty settlement process in 
two important ways.  First, Treaty settlements do not challenge the ultimate 
sovereignty of the Crown.  Second (and following from the first), the Crown is 
responsible for dispensing justice, and thus both the ‘judge’, and the historical 
‘wrongdoer’.  As a result, the justice of the Treaty settlement process is 
predominantly a negotiated justice.   
 
Temporal factors also influence, and constrain, the justice of the Treaty 
settlement process in important ways.  First, only contemporary Maori collectives 
with a continuous historical link to the groups that suffered past injustices will 
receive redress from the Crown.  Individuals will only benefit from settlements as 
members of such historically linked collectives.  Second, because of the difficulties 
of providing contemporary redress for historical wrongs, it is necessary to frame 
reparative justice in terms of the aim of ensuring cultural survival for Maori, 
which includes a present right to resources sufficient to restore and maintain 
Maori collectives.  This indicates that the influence of both ‘culture’ and ‘time’ 
work together to shape the justice of the Treaty settlement process.  It also 
points to a reconciliatory approach to reparative justice where the cultural 
survival of the Maori claimant group through restoration of the promises of the 
Treaty is given greater weight than the provision of full reparation for past 
wrongs. 
 
Finally, even though justice in the Treaty settlement process is largely reparative 
in that the aim is to right a past wrong, we do not want to create new injustices 
in the process.  A purely reparative approach to justice in the Treaty settlement 
process is inappropriate, and at times impractical.  The tides of history have 
changed the shoreline—there is no returning to a situation that once was, nor can 
we make the world a place where injustices of the past did not occur.  At best we 
can aim to limit the effects of past injustices in today’s New Zealand and for the 
future, and to undertake structural adjustments necessary to remit persisting 
unjust arrangements to better reflect the justice of the Treaty in contemporary 
contexts.  This paper has not attempted to determine the exact scope of 
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reparative justice, nor to determine the precise points where contemporary or 
prospective justice concerns will limit the application of reparative justice.  Given 
that the continued operation and success of the Treaty settlement process 
depends on the political will of a non-Maori majority, further debate on this issue 
is urgently required lest the process be perceived by the majority as creating 
avoidable new injustices and thereby lose political support. 
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Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and Legitimation, Auckland: 
Auckland University Press, 1999, pp. 96–97. 
22See B. Biggs, “Humpty-Dumpty and the Treaty of Waitangi,” in Ian H. Kawharu, 
ed., Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1989, pp. 305–306. 
23It has been suggested that if 'mana' had been used, few Maori rangatira would 
have signed the Treaty.  Ranganui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle 
Without End, Auckland: Penguin Books, 1990, pp91–93.  See also R. M. Ross, “Te 
Tiriti o Waitangi: Texts and Translations,” New Zealand Journal of History, Vol. 6, 
1972. 
24B. Biggs, “Humpty-Dumpty and the Treaty of Waitangi,” in Ian H. Kawharu, ed., 
Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi, Auckland: 
Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 308. 
25Ranganui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End, Auckland: 
Penguin Books, 1990, p93.  See also B. Biggs, “Humpty-Dumpty and the Treaty 
of Waitangi,” in Ian H. Kawharu, ed., Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha Perspectives of 
the Treaty of Waitangi, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1989, p. 310; and 
Frederick M. Brookfield, Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and 
Legitimation, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1999, pp. 100–107. 
26On 21 May 1840.  See Frederick M. Brookfield, Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: 
Revolution, Law and Legitimation, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1999, pp. 
97–98; and Ranganui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End, 
Auckland: Penguin Books, 1990, p97.  In the case of the North Island, the 
proclamation was made on the basis of the Treaty of Waitangi, and in the case of 
the South Island, on the basis of discovery (thereby assuming that the South 
Island was terra nullius, that is, an empty land).  The existence of Ngai Tahu, who 
inhabited the greater part of the South Island, was largely ignored (although 
several Ngai Tahu rangatira in fact signed the Treaty of Waitangi.  Claudia 
Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi, Wellington: Port Nicolson Press, 1997, pp. 77–
79. 
27Frederick M. Brookfield, Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and 
Legitimation, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1999.  Brookfield calls this a 
“quiet revolution”.   
28Wi Parata v The Bishop of Wellington (1877) 3 New Zealand Jur (NS) 72 (SC).  
See generally P. G. McHugh (1999) From Sovereignty Talk to Settlement Time: 
The Constitutional Setting of Maori Claims in the 1990s.  In P. Havemann (ed) 
Indigenous Peoples' Rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand Auckland, 
Oxford University Press, p449.   
29Alan Ward, The National Overview: Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui 
Series, a Report Commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington: GP 
Publications, 1997. 
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30Ranganui Walker, Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End, Auckland: 
Penguin Books, 1990, pp210–215; McHugh, From Sovereignty Talk to Settlement 
Time, p456. 
31Note also the well-known Bastion Point protests.   
32See generally Eddie T. Durie and Graeme S. Orr, “The Role of the Waitangi 
Tribunal and the Development of a Bicultural Jurisprudence,” New Zealand 
Universities Law Review, Vol. 14, 1990; and Richard P. Boast, “The Waitangi 
Tribunal: ‘Conscience of the Nation’, or Just Another Court?,” University of New 
South Wales Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1993. 
33In 1985, the jurisdiction of the Tribunal was made retrospective (Treaty of 
Waitangi Amendment Act 1985, s3(1), substituting new s6(1) of the principal Act) 
and in 1988 and 1989 the Tribunal was given powers to make binding 
recommendations for the return to Maori claimant groups of certain Crown lands 
(the Treaty of Waitangi (State Enterprises) Act 1988; Treaty of Waitangi Act 
1975, ss8A,8HB&8HJ).  See also John Dawson, “Remedial Powers of the Waitangi 
Tribunal,” Public Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2001.  Although note that the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal is progressively decreased with the 'full and final' 
settlement of Treaty claims.  Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, ss6(7)–6(12).  Note 
also the limitations on the Tribunal's jurisdiction with respect to recommendations 
relating to private land.  Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s6(4A). 
34A further indication of the Crown's growing acceptance of the Treaty of Waitangi 
is the inclusion of Treaty principles in legislation.  See for example, State-Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986, s9; Conservation Act 1987, s4; Resource Management Act 
1991, s8; Crown Minerals Act 1991, s4; and Hazardous Substances and New 
Organisms Act 1996, s8. 
35Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori 
Claims in New Zealand Since the 1970s, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
edn, 1997, pp. 33 & 86–103.  For a discussion of why a contractual, reparative 
approach appealed to both Maori and the Crown see pp. 33–34. 
36See for example Waitangi Tribunal, The Waiheke Island Claim Report (Wai 10), 
Wellington: Government Printing Office, 1987; Waitangi Tribunal, The Orakei 
Claim Report (Wai 9), Wellington: Brooker and Friend Ltd, 1987; Waitangi 
Tribunal, The Ngai Tahu Report (Wai 27), Wellington: Brooker and Friend Ltd, 
1991; Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi (Wai 143), 
Wellington: GP Publications, 1996; Waitangi Tribunal, Te Whanganui-A-Orotu 
Report on Remedies (Wai 55), Wellington: GP Publications, 1998; Waitangi 
Tribunal, The Turangi Township Remedies Report (Wai 84), Wellington: GP 
Publications, 1998; Waitangi Tribunal, “Determination of Preliminary Issues–In 
the Matter of the Muriwhenua Claims (Wai 45 and others),” Chief Judge Durie 
(Presiding Officer), 1998, unpublished memorandum. 
37Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori 
Claims in New Zealand Since the 1970s, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
edn, 1997, p. 133.  Added to this, the Treaty of Waitangi was inexpertly and 
hurriedly drawn up, there is much doubt as to how much, if anything at all, was 
understood by many signatories.  There can, therefore, only be speculation on 
the parties' exact intentions at the time of signing: B. Biggs, “Humpty-Dumpty 
and the Treaty of Waitangi,” in Ian H. Kawharu, ed., Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha 
Perspectives of the Treaty of Waitangi, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1989.  
See also R. M. Ross, “Te Tiriti o Waitangi: Texts and Translations,” New Zealand 
Journal of History, Vol. 6, 1972, p. 154; Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: 
The Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims in New Zealand Since the 1970s, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1997, p. 133.  Sharp illustrates how 
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the Tribunal, in its attempt to make the Treaty speak in contemporary contexts, 
has imputed intentions to the signatories that appear extremely unlikely to have 
been present in 1840.  Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and 
Practice of Maori Claims in New Zealand Since the 1970s, Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 2nd edn, 1997, pp. 135–139 referring to Waitangi Tribunal, Te 
Reo Report (Wai 11), Wellington: GP Publications, 1986, and Waitangi Tribunal, 
The Muriwhenua Fishing Claim Report (Wai 22), Wellington: GP Publications, 
1988. 
38Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori 
Claims in New Zealand Since the 1970s, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
edn, 1997, pp. 131–140 referring particularly to the Tribunal's Reports on the 
Waiau Power Station, Te Atiawa, the Kaituna River, the Manakau Harbour, Te Reo 
Maori and Muriwhenua Fishing. 
39Sharp refers to the development of a "jurisprudence of the wairua" of the 
Treaty.  Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of 
Maori Claims in New Zealand Since the 1970s, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 
2nd edn, 1997, pp. 163–177. 
40See for example the legislation cited at footnote 18, the Waitangi Tribunal 
Reports cited at footnote 36, New Zealand Maori Council v A-G [1994] 1 New 
ZealandLR 513 (PC), p517, per Lord Woolf and see New Zealand Maori Council v 
A-G [1987] 1 New ZealandLR 641 (CA), p663, per Cooke P. 
41The Waitangi Tribunal is required to have regard to the two texts of the Treaty 
of Waitangi (as set out in the First Schedule to the Treaty of Waitangi Act), and 
for the purposes of the Treaty of Waitangi Act, the Tribunal has exclusive 
authority to determine the meaning and effect of the Treaty.  Treaty of Waitangi 
Act 1975, s5(2). 
42For example see New Zealand Maori Council v A-G [1987] 1 New ZealandLR 641 
(CA); A-G v New Zealand Maori Council [1991] 2 New ZealandLR 129 (CA); New 
Zealand Maori Council v A-G [1992] 2 New ZealandLR 577 (CA); and see for 
example the following Tribunal reports, Waitangi Tribunal, The Waiheke Island 
Claim Report (Wai 10), Wellington: Government Printing Office, 1987; Waitangi 
Tribunal, The Orakei Claim Report (Wai 9), Wellington: Brooker and Friend Ltd, 
1987; Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngai Tahu Report (Wai 27), Wellington: Brooker 
and Friend Ltd, 1991; Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi 
(Wai 143), Wellington: GP Publications, 1996; Waitangi Tribunal, Te Whanganui-
A-Orotu Report on Remedies (Wai 55), Wellington: GP Publications, 1998; and 
Waitangi Tribunal, The Turangi Township Remedies Report (Wai 84), Wellington: 
GP Publications, 1998.   
43Note Brookfield's analysis, however, which suggests that the Crown took more 
sovereignty than it was ceded under the Treaty of Waitangi and has effected a 
'quiet revolution'.  Frederick M. Brookfield, Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: 
Revolution, Law and Legitimation, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1999. 
44Tipene O'Regan, Settlement negotiator, Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu, Interview with 
author, November 2000. 
45Susan Dodds, “Justice and Indigenous Land Rights,” Inquiry, Vol. 41, No. 2, p. 
197 (emphasis added). 
46James Tully, “Aboriginal Property and Western Theory: Recovering a Middle 
Ground”, in E. F. Paul, F. D. Miller and J. Paul, eds., Property Rights, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1994, p. 153.   
47Ibid, p154. 
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48Eddie T. Durie and Graeme S. Orr, “The Role of the Waitangi Tribunal and the 
Development of a Bicultural Jurisprudence,” New Zealand Universities Law 
Review, Vol. 14, 1990.  See also Richard P. Boast, “The Waitangi Tribunal: 
‘Conscience of the Nation’, or Just Another Court?,” University of New South 
Wales Law Review, Vol. 16, No. 1, 1993. 
49Susan Dodds, “Justice and Indigenous Land Rights,” Inquiry, Vol. 41, No. 2. 
50Note that the opinions of the Waitangi Tribunal are not binding on the courts in 
proceedings concerning Acts other than the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (see 
s5(2) of that Act), but are of "great value": New Zealand Maori Council v A-G 
[1987] 1 New ZealandLR 641 (CA), pp661–662, per Cooke P.  Note also that the 
Tribunal can only inquire into proposed legislation at the request of Parliament, or 
a Minister of the Crown.  Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, ss6&8. 
51The Tribunal has noted that the Crown may reject the Tribunal's findings, or not 
share the Tribunal's view as to the seriousness of any particular breach of the 
Treaty, both of which may lead to the Crown and the Tribunal having quite 
different views on appropriate remedies.  Waitangi Tribunal, The Turangi 
Township Remedies Report (Wai 84), Wellington: GP Publications, 1998, p. 34.  
For an analysis of the Crown's responsiveness to the Waitangi Tribunal's early 
recommendations see Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, 
Environmental Management and the Principles of the Treaty of Waitangi: Report 
on Crown Response to Recommendations of the Waitangi Tribunal 1983–1988, 
Wellington: Government Printer, 1988.  Note also that the Crown did not agree 
with the Tribunal's findings on the full and final 1940s settlement of Ngai Tahu's 
claims regarding Kemp's purchase, but agreed to negotiate with Ngai Tahu 
anyway.  Richard T. Price, The Politics of Modern History-Making: The 1990s 
Negotiations of the Ngai Tahu Tribe with the Crown to Achieve a Treaty of 
Waitangi Claims Settlement, Macmillan Brown Working Paper Series No 7, 
Christchurch: Macmillan Brown Centre for Pacific Studies, 2001, p. 7. 
52See the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, ss8A–8HJ.  For example in Te Whanganui-
A-Orotu Report on Remedies, the Tribunal did not make binding 
recommendations in a number of instances where it could have, preferring 
instead to leave the matter for settlement between the parties with the option of 
coming back to the Tribunal if a settlement could not be reached.  Waitangi 
Tribunal, Te Whanganui-A-Orotu Report on Remedies (Wai 55), Wellington: GP 
Publications, 1998, pp. 17 and following.  The Tribunal made its first binding 
recommendations in 1998 in the Turangi Township Remedies decision.  Waitangi 
Tribunal, The Turangi Township Remedies Report (Wai 84), Wellington: GP 
Publications, 1998.  However, Dawson suggests that the threat of the use of the 
Tribunal's binding powers is a great incentive for the Crown to reach settlements 
with claimant groups.  For a detailed analysis of the Tribunal's remedial powers 
see John Dawson, “Remedial Powers of the Waitangi Tribunal,” Public Law 
Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2001.  Further, in direct negotiations, where the Waitangi 
Tribnunal is not involved at all, the merger of the Crown's roles as 'provider of 
justice' and 'wrongdoer', and the resulting potential for conflict of interests, is 
particularly obvious.   
53Luban suggests that legal negotiation and political bargaining are beset with 
"the paradox of compromise: commitment to a principle means commitment to 
seeing it realized.  But in practice this means compromising the principle (since 
all-or-nothing politics is usually doomed to defeat)—and compromise is partial 
abandonment of the principle.  Conversely, refusal to compromise one's principles 
means in practice abandoning entirely the hope of seeing them realized.  Morality 
and its abandonment seem to implicate one another—that is the paradox of 
compromise".  David Luban, “Bargaining and Compromise: Recent Work on 
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Negotiation and Informal Justice,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, Vol. 14, No. 4, 
1985, pp. 414–415, original emphasis.  On negotiated justice see Ian Macduff, 
“The Role of Negotiation: Negotiated Justice,” Victoria University of Wellington 
Law Review, Vol. 25, 1995. 
54Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics” (translated by W. D. Ross 1925), in A. Ryan, 
ed., Justice: Oxford Readings in Politics and Government, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993, p. 35.  Western philosophers have suggested various 
theories to guide the distributions of social and economic arrangements and 
institutions based on criteria such as need, fairness, equality, complex equality, 
mutual advantage, reciprocity, impartiality, desert, or rights.  It is not the 
purpose of this paper to examine these debates.  See generally B. Cullen, 
“Philosophical Theories of Justice,” in Klaus R. Scherer, ed., Justice: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.  
Sharp defines distributive justice as "giving to classes of people what is theirs by 
right, where classes are distinguished by characteristics that call for or generate 
those good things that can be thought to be demanded for them as of right".  
Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims 
in New Zealand Since the 1970s, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 
1997, pp. 29–30.  See also L. MacDonald, “Justice and Maori: Reflections on 
Contemporary Justice Theory and Justice for Maori,” MA thesis, University of 
Canterbury, 1996, unpublished; and D. Miller, “Introduction,” in D. Miller and M. 
Walzer, eds., Pluralism, Justice, and Equality,Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1995.  Note also Nozick’s discussion of 'current time slice principles of justice'.  
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, pp. 
153–155. 
55Aristotle refers to the "distributions of honour or money or the other things that 
fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution".  Aristotle, 
“Nicomachean Ethics” (translated by W. D. Ross 1925), in A. Ryan, ed., Justice: 
Oxford Readings in Politics and Government, New York: Oxford University Press, 
1993, p. 35. 
56See, for example, Janna Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past: 
Reparation and Historical Injustices, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002, p. 38. 
57Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori 
Claims in New Zealand Since the 1970s, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
edn, 1997, p. 34.  Note that Sharp refers to an 'original' position in the passage 
quoted.  This has been omitted lest it be confused with Rawls' well-known 
concept of an original position in his theory of distributive justice.  
58Aristotle, “Nicomachean Ethics” (translated by W. D. Ross 1925), in A. Ryan, 
ed., Justice: Oxford Readings in Politics and Government, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1993, p. 38.  According to Aristotle, reparative justice involves 
equalising a wrong whereby the gain from that wrong is taken from the 
wrongdoer and the loss of the victim is given back.  Aristotle, “Nicomachean 
Ethics” (translated by W. D. Ross 1925), in A. Ryan, ed., Justice: Oxford Readings 
in Politics and Government, New York: Oxford University Press, 1993, p. 37 
59John Patterson, Exploring Maori Values, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 
1992, p. 117, and see generally pp116–123.  See also Raymond Firth, Economics 
of the New Zealand Maori, Wellington: New Zealand Government Printer, 1959 
reprinted 1972, pp. 388 & 412–417; Belinda A. Vial, “Finding the Essence of 
Pounamu: In Search of the Contemporary Value of Pounamu to Kai Tahu,” BA 
(Honours) Research Essay, Massey University, 1998, unpublished, p. 28; and 
Moana Jackson, The Maori and the Criminal Justice System A New Perspective: He 
Whaipaanga, Part 2, Wellington: Department of Justice, 1988, pp. 37–44. 
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60John Patterson, Exploring Maori Values, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 
1992, p. 135. 
61Douglas Graham, Trick or Treaty? Wellington: Institute of Policy Studies, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 1997, p. 72; Morris T. W. Love, Director, 
Waitangi Tribunal, Interview with author, April 2000.  See also the Waikato-Tainui 
settlement, stating that this principle guided the settlement reached.  Waikato 
Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995, Recital O. 
62Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992; James S. Fishkin, “Justice Between 
Generations: Compensation, Identity, and Group Membership”, in John W. 
Chapman, ed., Nomos XXXIII: Compensatory Justice New York and London: New 
York University Press, 1991; Christopher W. Morris, “Existential Limits to the 
Rectification of Past Wrongs,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2; 
George Sher, “Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
Vol. 10, No. 1, 1981; George Sher, “Compensation and Transworld Personal 
Identity,” The Monist, Vol. 62, 1979; Samuel C. Wheeler III, “Reparations 
Reconsidered,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1997; and also 
Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p. 152 
raising the issue.  
63See also Robert Sparrow, “History and Collective Responsibility”, Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 3, 2000. 
64Samuel C. Wheeler III, “Reparations Reconsidered,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1997. 
65For example, Christopher W. Morris, “Existential Limits to the Rectification of 
Past Wrongs,” American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 21, No. 2. 
66Ibid; Wheeler also reaches the conclusion that the descendants of victims of 
historical injustice cannot claim contemporary reparation for historical injustices, 
although by a different logic.  Samuel C. Wheeler III, “Reparations Reconsidered,” 
American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1997. 
67Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s6(1). 
68Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 167.  See also the line of argument 
developed by David Lyons, “The New Indian Claims and Original Rights to Land,” 
Social Theory and Practice, Vol. 4, No. 3, 1977.  See also Duncan Ivison, “Political 
Community and Historical Injustice,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, 
No. 3, 2000. 
69Samuel C. Wheeler III, “Reparations Reconsidered,” American Philosophical 
Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3, 1997, p. 303.  Wheeler goes on to consider the nature 
of 'communities' and concludes that they are social constructs that can be 
"intentional artefacts".  When communities are the recipients of compensation for 
past injustices, this conclusion, Wheeler argues, has two unjust consequences.  
The first is that because communities, and their members, are self-identifying, 
groups can constitute identities in order to create moral obligations on others 
(such as the obligation to restore past wrongs), or alternatively, to avoid moral 
obligations.  Further, individuals can opt in or out of communities according to 
whether or not it will benefit them.  Second, he argues that further wrongs can 
reduce moral debt, for example by the suppression of the identity or 
consciousness of a community that would otherwise be entitled to reparations for 
past wrongs.  He therefore concludes that there is no justification for the 
widespread intuition that the descendants of the perpetrators of injustice should 
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make reparation to the descendants of the victims of those injustices.  Wheeler 
then proceeds to argue why there are good reasons, but not obligations, for why 
this should in fact occur (at p. 305–306).   
70Ibid, p. 303. 
71George Sher, “Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1981, p. 8. 
72See also Roy Perett, “Individualism, Justice, and the Maori View of the Self,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
73Brookfield describes this division of the Crown as part of a 'quiet revolution', 
that is not provided for under the Treaty of Waitangi.  Frederick M. Brookfield, 
Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and Legitimation, Auckland: 
Auckland University Press, 1999. 
74New Zealand Maori Council v A-G [1994] 1 New ZealandLR 513 (PC), p517.  
See Frederick M. Brookfield, Waitangi and Indigenous Rights: Revolution, Law and 
Legitimation, Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1999, p. 126. 
75Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 155. 
76Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s6(1). 
77For example, historian Angela Ballara suggests that ‘iwi’ is a post-colonial 
political construct, which replaced the hapu as the primary political unit in Maori 
society in the 20th century, or earlier: Angela Ballara, Iwi: The Dynamics of Maori 
Tribal Organisation from c.1769 to c.1945, Wellington: Victoria University Press, 
1998, p. 336.  Ward also makes this point: "It should be recognised that most of 
the Maori structures above the level of hapu clusters are post-colonial in any 
case."  Alan Ward, The National Overview: Waitangi Tribunal Rangahaua Whanui 
Series, a Report Commissioned by the Waitangi Tribunal, Wellington: GP 
Publications, 1997, Vol. 1, p. 141.  See also T. Crocker, “Iwi or Hapu? The 
Imposition of a Static Structure on a Dynamic Society,” BA (Honours) Research 
Essay, Massey University, 1993, unpublished. 
78Governed by the Maori Trust Boards Act 1955. 
79Governed by the Incorporated Societies Act 1908. 
80Governed by Part XIII of Te Ture Whenua Maori Act 1993.  
81See for example Te Runanga o Ngai Tahu Act 1996. 
82See for example, Meredith K. Gibbs, “Are New Zealand Treaty of Waitangi 
Settlements Achieving Justice? The Ngai Tahu settlement and the return of 
pounamu (greenstone),” PhD thesis, University of Otago, 2002, unpublished, ch 8 
and Meredith K. Gibbs, “What Structures are Appropriate to Receive Treaty of 
Waitangi Settlement Assets?” New Zealand Universities Law Review, Vol. 21, No. 
2, 2004 for discussion of these issues in relation to the Ngai Tahu settlement and 
the return of pounamu. 
83The fragmentation of traditional Maori groups, and group identity is a huge 
problem in the Treaty settlement process, often taking shape as disputes about 
mandate.  The recent events in Taranaki are a good example.  See Waitangi 
Tribunal, The Pakakohi and Tangahoe Settlement Claims Report (Wai 758), 
Wellington: Legislation Direct, 2000, especially at p. 28.   
84Because any Maori, as an individual, can make a claim to the Waitangi Tribunal, 
the hearing process at least offers the opportunity to state a case against the 
Crown and to have the Tribunal report on that case.  Note also Janna Thompson, 
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Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical Injustices, 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002. pp. 42-43. 
85For example, the Taranaki settlements.   
86For example, the ancillary claims included in the Ngai Tahu, Ngati Turangituku 
and Ngati Awa settlements.   
87Waldron also raises other problems with a counterfactual approach to 
reparations, one of which he terms "the contagion of injustice".  Jeremy Waldron, 
“Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in Graham Oddie and 
Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1992, p. 151 (original emphasis).  The idea is that unjust 
market transactions affect the whole market.  For example, one fraudulent 
transaction whereby a purchase of land is made at a drastically reduced price, or 
expropriated without recompense, will tend to reduce the price of a similar 
holding, even when acquired justly.  This is the work of the free market.  If we 
apply Nozick's principle of justice in rectification and make the world as it would 
have been had the injustice not occurred, then all holdings affected by the 
injustice must be adjusted.  This approach could call into question all present 
landholdings (at p. 152).  One can only begin to imagine the difficulties of 
undertaking such a task. 
88Note Robert Sparrow’s argument that while we cannot erase past injustices we 
can alter their significance and transform them.  Robert Sparrow, “History and 
Collective Responsibility,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 3, 
2000. 
89Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 154. 
90Ibid. 
91Ibid, p. 145. 
92Ibid, pp. 146–153.  Note the use of counterfactuals by Nozick in his theory of 
justice in rectification.  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: 
Basic Books, 1974, pp. 152–153. 
93Sharp notes the difference in legal theory between the remedy in contract law 
(to restore the wronged party to the position they would have been if the promise 
had been kept) and tort law (where the remedy intends to put the victim in the 
position had the wrong not occurred).  Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The 
Philosophy and Practice of Maori Claims in New Zealand Since the 1970s, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2nd edn, 1997, p. 35. 
94Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 146 & 153–159.  It must be 
acknowledged, however, that the damage to the Maori-Crown relationship, 
particularly the loss of trust, caused by historical injustices will be difficult to heal. 
95Ibid, p146. 
96Ibid, p149. 
97Ibid, pp146–153, quote at p150.  The Waitangi Tribunal has noted that the 
counterfactual approach is problematic because "a host of variables confront the 
programming of a just calculation [of compensation]; and the assessment of 
'what might have been' is highly subjective".  Waitangi Tribunal, The Orakei Claim 
Report (Wai 9), Wellington: Brooker and Friend Ltd, 1987, p. 263. 
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98A related argument is made by George Sher, “Ancient Wrongs and Modern 
Rights,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1981, particularly at pp. 
12–13.  In constructing a counterfactual world where an injustice is rectified, we 
run into problems of the transferability of a person's entitlements in the 
counterfactual world to the real world.  Sher suggests that there are two distinct 
factors at play here: "[Transferability] is limited first by the degree to which one's 
actual entitlements have been diminished by one's own omissions in this world, 
and second by the degree to which one's entitlements in a rectified world are 
generated anew by one's own actions there." (at p. 12).  The point is that in 
constructing a counterfactual world, we assume people will act in certain ways 
that may bear little resemblance to the real world.  For example, we may assume 
that had victim V's land not been taken unjustly, V would have developed that 
land and used it to provide a livelihood.  But given that V did none of those things 
in the real world, how can we justify that assumption and, say, compensate V as 
if he had done these things?  What if we know that V's belief would suggest that 
he would not have developed the land in any manner?  Sher suggests, then, that 
the value that must be compensated is the lost opportunity to develop or 
otherwise use the land, and not the value of the goods produced by having had 
the opportunity.  He then takes the issue of transferability one step further.  
Applying this reasoning to historical injustices, he suggests that transferability 
diminishes over time because the actions and omissions in the real world have a 
greater and greater effect on V and V's descendants' entitlements acquired in the 
real world and less and less over time can be attributed to the historical injustice.  
The argument that the moral weight of injustices may fade over time will be 
discussed more fully below.   
99Chief Judge Durie, in Waitangi Tribunal, The Waiheke Island Claim Report (Wai 
10), Wellington: Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 41.  For other examples 
see Waitangi Tribunal, The Orakei Claim Report (Wai 9), Wellington: Brooker and 
Friend Ltd, 1987; Waitangi Tribunal, The Ngai Tahu Report (Wai 27), Wellington: 
Brooker and Friend Ltd, 1991; Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report: Kaupapa 
Tuatahi (Wai 143), Wellington: GP Publications, 1996; Waitangi Tribunal, Te 
Whanganui-A-Orotu Report on Remedies (Wai 55), Wellington: GP Publications, 
1998; Waitangi Tribunal, The Turangi Township Remedies Report (Wai 84), 
Wellington: GP Publications, 1998; Waitangi Tribunal, “Determination of 
Preliminary Issues–In the Matter of the Muriwhenua Claims (Wai 45 and others),” 
Chief Judge Durie (Presiding Officer), 1998, unpublished memorandum. 
100Janna Thompson resolves Waldron’s concern about the limitations of rational 
choice theory differently.  See Janna Thompson, “Historical Obligations,” 
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 3, 2000, pp. 341-342. 
101Meredith K. Gibbs, “Are New Zealand Treaty of Waitangi Settlements Achieving 
Justice? The Ngai Tahu settlement and the return of pounamu (greenstone),” PhD 
thesis, University of Otago, 2002, unpublished, ch 2. 
102Loren E. Lomasky, “Compensation and the Bounds of Rights”, in John W. 
Chapman, ed., Nomos XXXIII: Compensatory Justice New York and London: New 
York University Press, 1991, pp. 27-29; Janna Thompson, Taking Responsibility 
for the Past: Reparation and Historical Injustices, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002, 
p. 96. 
103Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998, s6.  The apology is recorded in both 
Maori and English in the Deed of Agreement and the Ngai Tahu Claims Settlement 
Act 1998.  In addition, it was spoken by the then Prime Minister, Jenny Shipley, 
at Onuku Marae on 29 November 1998. 
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104See Gerald F. Gaus, “Does Compensation Restore Equality?” in John W. 
Chapman, ed., Nomos XXXIII: Compensatory Justice New York and London: New 
York University Press, 1991 and Thompson’s discussion of Gaus’ arguments: 
Janna Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical 
Injustices, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002, pp. 48-49. 
105Janna Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical 
Injustices, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002, p. 53. 
106Ibid, p. 52. 
107Ibid, p. 50. 
108Ibid, pp. 50-53. 
109Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New York: Basic Books, 1974, p. 
231.  Even Nozick, who generally dismisses the right of the state to redistribute 
resources other than to rectify injustice in acquisitions or transfers in holdings, is 
unable to separate totally reparative and distributive justice.  While Nozick argues 
that justice is simply historical—the justice of a given situation depends on how it 
came about—he suggests that there is a role, albeit limited, for distributive 
justice (at p. 153).  Phillips suggests that "rectification to correct earlier injustice 
might do more than Rawls' theory of justice to redress existing inequalities, and is 
preferable (morally speaking) to redistribution in the name of equality".  David L. 
Phillips, Equality, Justice and Rectification: An Exploration in Normative Sociology, 
London and New York: Academic Press, 1979, p. 258.  Further, in adopting a 
version of the Lockean proviso that 'enough and as good' must be left to others in 
initial acquisitions, Nozick concedes that background circumstances may impinge 
on our conception of justice.  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New 
York: Basic Books, 1974, p. 174–182.  This latter point is also made by Waldron: 
Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992, pp. 159–160. 
110Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 152. 
111Ibid, p. 153 (original emphasis). 
112Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori 
Claims in New Zealand Since the 1970s, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
edn, 1997, p. 158.  See also Meredith K. Gibbs, “Are New Zealand Treaty of 
Waitangi Settlements Achieving Justice? The Ngai Tahu settlement and the return 
of pounamu (greenstone),” PhD thesis, University of Otago, 2002, unpublished, 
ch 2. 
113Waitangi Tribunal, The Waiheke Island Claim Report (Wai 10), Wellington: 
Government Printing Office, 1987, p. 41. 
114But see Robert Sparrow’s argument that while we cannot erase past injustices 
we can alter their significance and transform them.  Robert Sparrow, “History and 
Collective Responsibility,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 3, 
2000. 
115Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of Maori 
Claims in New Zealand Since the 1970s, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2nd 
edn, 1997, p. 35.  This is not to argue that the Crown can divest itself of 
resources without regard to Maori Treaty claims.  Note the case of New Zealand 
Maori Council v A-G [1987] 1 New ZealandLR 641 (CA), in response to which the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal was amended by the Treaty of Waitangi (State 
Enterprises) Act 1988 giving the Waitangi Tribunal powers to make binding 
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recommendations for the return to Maori ownership of land transferred to state-
owned enterprises under the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986.  Later, the 
Crown Forest Assets Act 1989 gave the Tribunal powers to make binding 
recommendations for the return of Crown forest land.  The lands that may be 
subject to the Tribunal’s binding recommendations are Crown forest land subject 
to a Crown forestry licence, or memorialised lands.  Memorialised lands are those 
owned, or formerly owned, by a state-owned enterprise or a tertiary institution, 
or former New Zealand Railways lands that have a notation on the certificate of 
title that the Tribunal may order their return to Maori ownership.  Treaty of 
Waitangi Act 1975, ss8A,8HB&8HJ. 
116In any rectification of injustice in holdings there is necessarily a redistribution 
of resources in society.  David L. Phillips, Equality, Justice and Rectification: An 
Exploration in Normative Sociology, London and New York: Academic Press, 1979, 
p. 257.  The important point to bear in mind is that, as Nozick acknowledges, 
whether something can properly be described as 'redistributive' depends on the 
reasons for the redistribution.  Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia, New 
York: Basic Books, 1974, p. 27.  See also David L. Phillips, Equality, Justice and 
Rectification: An Exploration in Normative Sociology, London and New York: 
Academic Press, 1979, p. 257.  
117Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 156–159. 
118Waldron refers to the legal doctrines of prescription and adverse possession 
and the procedural bar of the statue of limitations. He gives two pragmatic 
reasons for the diminution of historical entitlements over time.  The first concerns 
the difficulties of obtaining accurate evidence of events occurring generations 
ago.  The success of the Waitangi Tribunal in its hearing and research of historical 
evidence relating to Crown breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi from 1840 up to 
1992 indicates the fragility of this argument in the New Zealand context.  Second, 
he argues that people build up structures and expectations around resources 
actually under their control that would be "costly and disruptive" to disturb in the 
name of restitution.  Ibid, pp. 155–156.  This latter point is picked up below. 
119Ibid, pp157–158.  Note that both Waldron and Nozick reject Locke's mixing of 
labour thesis "as implausible and incoherent": Jeremy Waldron, “Historic 
Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in Graham Oddie and Roy W. 
Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, Auckland: Oxford 
University Press, 1992, p157. 
Waldron's view of initial entitlement is, however, not the only one.  The initial 
acquisition of land and resources by Maori in New Zealand can also be viewed as 
legitimate either according to Maori custom or tikanga, or, in accordance with the 
Treaty of Waitangi as the relevant social contract that established New Zealand 
society.  Jindra Tichy and Graham Oddie, “Is the Treaty of Waitangi a Social 
Contract?” in Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New 
Zealand Society, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992; David L. Phillips, 
Equality, Justice and Rectification: An Exploration in Normative Sociology, London 
and New York: Academic Press, 1979, p. 261.  Either way, land and resource 
dealings between the Crown and Maori should have been conducted in accordance 
with the Treaty as containing a shared notion of justice.  According to the social 
contract thesis, the persistence of moral claims to land and resources depends 
rather on interpretations of the Treaty, than on an analysis of whether any 
particular entitlement can be said to have ceased to play an indispensable role in 
the life of particular Maori or Maori collectives. 
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120For example see K. R. Wilson, Submission to the Waitangi Tribunal: Ngai Tahu 
Claim (Wai 27), Doc #H8, p22; Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report: Kaupapa 
Tuatahi (Wai 143), Wellington: GP Publications, 1996, and comments in Waitangi 
Tribunal, The Turangi Township Remedies Report (Wai 84), Wellington: GP 
Publications, 1998, pp. 14–15.  See also Harry C. Evison, Te Wai Pounamu The 
Greenstone Island: A History of the Southern Maori During the European 
Colonization of New Zealand, Wellington and Christchurch: Aoraki Press, 1993.  
This can be said of most Indigenous peoples.  United Nations, Development and 
Human Rights Section, The Significance of Land to Indigenous Peoples, 
Information Paper (DPI/2068–99 26210), United Nations Department of Public 
Information, 1999. 
121Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 158–159.  Waldron merely suggests 
that the return of particular sites integral to aboriginal identity and cultural 
survival may have "an edge" over claims for the return of land of mainly 
economic value.  In the New Zealand context, these might be wahi tapu sites 
(sacred or burial sites), mahinga kai (food gathering sites), or prominent 
landmarks associated with eponymous ancestors 
122George Sher, “Ancient Wrongs and Modern Rights,” Philosophy and Public 
Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1981, pp. 8–10 (emphasis added).  Waldron's approach 
gives little consideration to values other than property.  Susan Dodds, “Justice 
and Indigenous Land Rights,” Inquiry, Vol. 41, No. 2, p. 197.  See also Janna 
Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical 
Injustices, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002 and Janna Thompson, “Historical 
Obligations,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 3, 2000, pp. 342-
344. 
123Waitangi Tribunal, The Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi (Wai 143), 
Wellington: GP Publications, 1996, p. 134.  Even in the case of the Ngai Tahu 
claim, where no land was confiscated but instead the Crown failed to ensure that 
Ngai Tahu retained sufficient land for their future needs, the results are similar:  
loss of mana, loss of rangatiratanga, loss of turangawaewae.  Waitangi Tribunal, 
The Ngai Tahu Report (Wai 27), Wellington: Brooker and Friend Ltd, 1991.  
Justice demands that these wrongs also be righted.   
124Waitangi Tribunal, The Muriwhenua Land Report (Wai 45), Wellington: GP 
Publications, 1997, p. 406.  Note also John Dawson, “Remedial Powers of the 
Waitangi Tribunal,” Public Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2001. 
125Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 165 (original emphasis). 
126Janna Thompson, “Historical Obligations,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 
Vol. 78, No. 3, 2000, p. 343.  See also Duncan Ivison, “Political Community and 
Historical Injustice,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 3, 2000. 
127Janna Thompson, Taking Responsibility for the Past: Reparation and Historical 
Injustices, Cambridge: Polity Press, p. 52.  Although note that Thompson argues 
that claims to retain individual property rights may be weak when compared to 
the claims of Indigenous peoples to have their lands returned as part of 
reparation for historical injustices (at p. 92). 
128Waitangi Tribunal, The Muriwhenua Land Report (Wai 45), Wellington: GP 
Publications, 1997, p. 406, emphasis added.  Note also John Dawson, “Remedial 
Powers of the Waitangi Tribunal,” Public Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, 2001. 
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129This is implied in the Tribunal's comments in Waitangi Tribunal, The Turangi 
Township Remedies Report (Wai 84), Wellington: GP Publications, 1998, p. 35. 
130For further details see Meredith K. Gibbs, “Are New Zealand Treaty of Waitangi 
Settlements Achieving Justice? The Ngai Tahu settlement and the return of 
pounamu (greenstone),” PhD thesis, University of Otago, 2002, unpublished.  
Note also that New Zealand’s Treaty settlement process specifically excludes the 
return of privately owned property: Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, s6(4A).  
Thompson argues that the return of private property as reparation is not 
necessarily unjust.  See Janna Thompson, “Historical Obligations,” Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 78, No. 3, 2000, p. 344. 
131Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 166.  This in the second of Waldron’s 
two important provisos to his thesis of supersession of historical injustices, and it 
is these that critics must fully appreciate (at p. 166–167).  One critic who has 
failed to account adequately for Waldron's proviso is Susan Dodds.  Susan Dodds, 
“Justice and Indigenous Land Rights,” Inquiry, Vol. 41, No. 2.  The first proviso 
for the application of any supersession is that contemporary society is actively 
and honestly attempting to achieve just future arrangements.  In the New 
Zealand context this is shown by the current Treaty settlement process and also 
by policies such as the (former) Labour/Alliance Coalition Government's 'Closing 
the Gaps'. 
132Jeremy Waldron, “Historic Injustice: Its Remembrance and Supersession,” in 
Graham Oddie and Roy W. Perett, eds., Justice, Ethics and New Zealand Society, 
Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1992, p. 167.  Note that Phillips also argues 
along these lines.  David L. Phillips, Equality, Justice and Rectification: An 
Exploration in Normative Sociology, London and New York: Academic Press, 1979, 
chapters 9 & 10. 
133On the contribution of the Treaty settlement process to reducing Maori-Pakeha 
social inequality see Meredith K. Gibbs, “Moving Beyond Social Inequality? The 
Contribution of the Settlement of Historic Grievances,’ paper presented to the 
Sasakawa International Forum 2001: Perspectives on Social Inequalities: Issues 
of Race, Class and Gender, Washington DC, 2001, October 31–November 2, 
unpublished. 
134Argument of Crown counsel referred to in Waitangi Tribunal, The Turangi 
Township Remedies Report (Wai 84), Wellington: GP Publications, 1998, p. 15. 
135Waitangi Tribunal, The Muriwhenua Land Report (Wai 45), Wellington: GP 
Publications, 1997, p. 406.  Also referred to in Waitangi Tribunal, The Turangi 
Township Remedies Report (Wai 84), Wellington: GP Publications, 1998, p. 14. 
136Waitangi Tribunal, “Memorandum Following Eighth Hearing–In the Matter of 
Ngati Awa and other claims of the Eastern Bay of Plenty (Wai 46 and others),” 
Tribunal Member G. S. Orr, 1995, unpublished memorandum, p. 11. 
137Ibid, p. 12. 
138Waitangi Tribunal, The Muriwhenua Land Report (Wai 45), Wellington: GP 
Publications, 1997, pp. 405–406.  See also Waitangi Tribunal, The Orakei Claim 
Report (Wai 9), Wellington: Brooker and Friend Ltd, 1987, pp. 263–264; Waitangi 
Tribunal, “Memorandum Following Eighth Hearing–In the Matter of Ngati Awa and 
other claims of the Eastern Bay of Plenty (Wai 46 and others),” Tribunal Member 
G. S. Orr, 1995, unpublished memorandum, pp. 10–11; Waitangi Tribunal, The 
Taranaki Report: Kaupapa Tuatahi (Wai 143), Wellington: GP Publications, 1996, 
pp. 15, 312 & 314.  Note that Crown counsel in the Turangi Township Remedies 
hearing accepted that remedies should not be assessed on a damages basis.  
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Waitangi Tribunal, The Turangi Township Remedies Report (Wai 84), Wellington: 
GP Publications, 1998, p. 15. 
139John Patterson, Exploring Maori Values, Palmerston North: Dunmore Press, 
1992, pp. 120–121.  Note that Patterson is discounting the theory that utu can 
involve forbearance. 
140Sharp suggests that Maori calls for justice were "Janus-faced, looking both 
ways".  Andrew Sharp, Justice and the Maori: The Philosophy and Practice of 
Maori Claims in New Zealand Since the 1970s, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 
2nd edn, 1997, p. 157. 
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